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Many economic models of climate change focus on trading off the costs and benefits of
emission reductions, but the political process is instead oriented towards hard limits on global
warming (Jaeger and Jaeger, 2010). In 2009, both the G8 group of developed countries and
the Major Economies Forum supported a 2 degrees Celsius limit. The 2009 Copenhagen
Accord and 2010 Cancun Agreements subsequently enshrined this 2 degrees Celsius limit
as the goal of the United Nations negotiations towards a new climate change treaty (Gillis,
2014). Most observers expect temperature limits to continue directing the scientific and
political discourse.1
In response, the economic modeling community has extensively analyzed the implications
of temperature limits for the cost and structure of emission policy (Clarke et al., 2014). Its
primary tools are multisector general equilibrium models that determine the cheapest policy
route to achieve a prespecified environmental goal. These numerical “cost-effectiveness inte-
grated assessment models” are typically too complex to directly optimize each period’s tax
on greenhouse gas emissions. Instead, they often adopt analytic results about the shape of
the least-cost tax trajectory from the theoretical economics literature and then solve for the
market equilibrium consistent with that policy path (Bauer et al., 2015). Contrary to conven-
tional wisdom (e.g., Tol, 2013), we show that these analytic results do not apply to the case
of temperature limits. Previous theoretical literature recommends an exponentially increas-
ing tax on greenhouse gas emissions to achieve a limit on total pollution, but we show that
the least-cost policy path to achieve a temperature limit actually employs a nonmonotonic
tax on emissions which increases more slowly than exponentially. By implementing inappro-
priate theoretical results, general equilibrium models’ results have overstated the minimum
cost of achieving temperature limits, overestimated the level of the near-term emission tax
consistent with these limits, and overvalued technologies that mature sooner rather than
later.
The conventional theoretical result implemented by general equilibrium models is that
when policymakers seek to limit the quantity of carbon dioxide (CO2) in the atmosphere,
the least-cost tax on CO2 emissions increases at the rate of interest plus the rate at which
CO2 “decays” in the atmosphere (Nordhaus, 1980, 1982; Peck and Wan, 1996; Goulder and
Mathai, 2000).2 This least-cost trajectory is commonly called a Hotelling trajectory: if we
consider the atmosphere’s CO2-holding capacity as an exhaustible resource whose quantity is
fixed by the chosen CO2 limit, then the least-cost policy depletes the resource (via emissions)
1Many economists have criticized environmental targets as implying an unrealistic jump in the damages
from climate change (e.g., Nordhaus, 2008; Tol, 2013), but other economists have argued that we know
too little about the economic costs of climate change to undertake a meaningful cost-benefit assessment
(e.g., Pindyck, 2013; Stern, 2013). The latter perspective has, in the spirit of Baumol (1972), led some
economists to argue for limiting economics to cost-effectiveness analyses of scientifically-grounded limits on
total warming (e.g., Richels et al., 2004; Ackerman et al., 2009). We take no stand on this debate. Instead,
we analyze the economic implications of the dominant approach to long-run climate policy.
2A number of papers, including Goulder and Mathai (2000), also explore how induced technological
change affects the carbon tax trajectory.
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according to the analysis of Hotelling (1931). The intuition is as follows. Along a least-cost
trajectory, the policymaker must be indifferent to small deviations in the trajectory. Imagine
that the policymaker considers deviating by allowing an additional unit of emissions today.
Instead of spending money on reducing emissions today, the policymaker would invest those
savings and compensate by undertaking additional emission reductions t years in the future.
In order to return to the original CO2 trajectory, the policymaker will not need to reduce
future emissions by a full unit because the additional unit of emissions will have decayed at
rate δ. By deviating in this fashion, the policymaker has earned interest at rate r in the
years prior to t and has also seen the required spending decline at the rate δ of CO2 decay.
In order for the policymaker to be indifferent to this deviation, the marginal cost of emission
reductions (i.e., the tax on CO2 emissions) must grow at rate r + δ.
We show that this logic is incomplete when policymakers aim to limit total warming.
The reason is that an increase in CO2 neither immediately nor fully translates into an
increase in warming. The climate system displays substantial inertia, warming only slowly
in response to additional CO2.
3 A year’s temperature is driven not just by the contemporary
quantity of CO2 in the atmosphere but also by the level of CO2 in previous years. Additional
warming incurred by temporarily raising CO2 cannot be undone simply by returning to the
original CO2 trajectory. By allowing additional warming over the next t years, a policymaker
sacrifices some of the braking services provided by the inertia in the climate system. In
order to return to the original temperature trajectory, the policymaker must undertake a
sufficiently large quantity of emission reductions to bring time t CO2 some distance below its
original trajectory. This additional spending offsets the policymaker’s earnings from interest
and from the natural decay of CO2. If the tax on CO2 emissions increases exponentially, the
policymaker could profitably deviate by borrowing money from time t to finance additional
early emission reductions and then repaying the loan out of the savings from allowing greater
emissions at a future time when the CO2 tax has grown larger. The policymaker’s profits
arise because, by retaining more of the climate system’s braking services, the additional
early emission reductions allow the policymaker to increase time t emissions by a greater
amount before reaching the original temperature trajectory. In order for the policymaker to
be indifferent to small deviations in the emission trajectory, the tax on CO2 emissions must
grow more slowly than exponentially.4
3For example, interactions with ocean heat sinks mean that the next decades’ warming will represent
only about 50–60% of the eventual equilibrium warming corresponding to their likely CO2 concentrations
(Solomon et al., 2009). Even if we were to freeze all greenhouse gases at their current concentrations, the
climate system’s inertia means that we could expect total warming to more than double from the current
level (Wetherald et al., 2001).
4The effect of inertia on the efficient CO2 tax has rough parallels in the theory of nonrenewable resource
extraction. Levhari and Liviatan (1977) extend the Hotelling setting so that the marginal cost of extraction
increases in cumulative extraction. They show that equilibrium marginal profit grows more slowly than the
rate of interest. If marginal profit grew faster than the rate of interest, then the resource owner would delay
extraction in order to reduce future costs. In our setting, if the marginal cost of emitting grew at the (decay-
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The presence of inertia in the climate system is valuable for a policy aiming to limit total
warming. This value manifests itself in two ways. First, the climate system’s braking services
allow the policymaker to delay emission reductions without immediately incurring the full
temperature penalty. For any positive consumption discount rate, the temporary disconnect
between CO2 and temperature provides a valuable degree of freedom which the policymaker
uses to lower the present cost of policy. Second, the climate system’s braking services allow
the policymaker to reduce the cumulative quantity of abatement undertaken over time. By
delaying the temperature consequences of additional emissions, the climate system’s inertia
provides more time for emissions to decay naturally. Even if future abatement costs are not
discounted, the policymaker reallocates abatement over time so as to reduce the cumulative
quantity of abatement undertaken. In the presence of discounting or of natural decay of
CO2, the climate system’s inertia allows for a lower initial tax and reduces the overall cost
of the policy program.
We derive an intuitive analytic expression for the least-cost emission trajectory in the
presence of inertia and analyze its implications for climate policy. The least-cost emission tax
trajectory is composed of two terms. The first, positive component is the classic Hotelling
term, which makes the emission tax rise at the decay-adjusted interest rate. This first
component would be the only component if the environmental target were expressed in terms
of CO2 or if temperature responded immediately to CO2. The second, negative component is
novel. At time t, this term is the product of the shadow cost of temperature and the change in
time t temperature due to a marginal increase in time 0 abatement. The positive shadow cost
of temperature reflects that additional warming uses up more of the atmosphere’s braking
capacity, even holding CO2 constant. As temperature approaches the exogenous limit, its
shadow cost grows large and this second component of the efficient emission tax becomes
large in magnitude. The efficient emission tax therefore tends to decrease as the policymaker
steers the climate into a steady state at the temperature limit.
Three specific results stand out. First, the least-cost CO2 trajectory always overshoots
the steady-state CO2 level associated with a given temperature target.
5 The climate system’s
adjusted) rate of interest, then the policymaker would emit less now in order to increase emissions in the
future. Further, Heal (1976) considers a case in which marginal cost becomes constant at a high enough level
of cumulative extraction. He shows that the equilibrium resource price falls towards the long-run marginal
cost. This result is similar to our carbon price dynamics immediately prior to reaching the long-run carbon
price consistent with maintaining temperature exactly at the limit.
5Some numerical analyses have discussed “overshoot” pathways in the context of very low CO2 targets
and very low temperature targets (e.g., van Vuuren et al., 2011), but they often frame overshoot as a
last resort rather than as a least-cost pathway in its own right. Remarks in Wigley (2003), Huntingford
and Lowe (2007), and Wigley et al. (2007) suggested that overshoot trajectories might in fact be cheaper
ways of achieving climate goals, and simulations in, for instance, den Elzen and van Vuuren (2007) and
Clarke et al. (2009) have supported this conjecture. The latest report from the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change included overshoot scenarios and discussed how they affect the probability of maintaining
temperature below given limits (Clarke et al., 2014). These scenarios have not used the least-cost trajectory
derived in our work.
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inertia provides a benefit: it allows emission reductions to be postponed without overshooting
the temperature target. The least-cost emission path takes advantage of this delayed climatic
response. Our calibrated numerical example suggests that the least-cost path overshoots a
temperature target’s steady-state CO2 level by 50–100 ppm. The climate system’s inertia
enables a policymaker to temporarily increase CO2 by approximately twice as much as in a
case without inertia.
Second, we show that recognizing the effect of inertia makes the efficient CO2 tax path
nonmonotonic and tends to decrease the efficient present-day CO2 tax. By acting as a brake
on warming, climatic inertia enables the policymaker to delay abatement and to reduce
cumulative abatement, which reduces the initially efficient emission tax. Numerically, recog-
nizing inertia can decrease the initial emission tax used to achieve a 2◦C temperature target
by 90%. The emission tax eventually reaches very high levels as the policymaker seeks to
reduce the CO2 concentration from its peak level, but as the CO2 concentration then de-
clines towards its required steady-state level, the emission tax also begins declining towards
its corresponding steady-state level. Such a nonmonotonic pathway is not consistent with
the standard Hotelling assumption.
Third, we show that a temperature target is always cheaper than the corresponding CO2
target because it allows the policymaker to take advantage of the braking services provided
by climatic inertia. If the primary benefits of either target arise from avoiding higher tem-
peratures (as opposed to avoiding higher CO2 or inducing a transition path with a particular
damage profile), then this result argues strongly for refocusing policy and modeling efforts
on temperature limits instead of CO2 limits. Numerically, we find that a 2
◦C temperature
target can be many times cheaper than its corresponding CO2 target, trimming trillions of
dollars from the present cost of the policy. The CO2 target requires 20–25% more abatement
over the next 200 years while also undertaking abatement earlier than necessary. Conven-
tional economic models with Hotelling assumptions may be substantially overestimating the
cost of policies to limit total warming.
Section 1 describes the model setting and shows that the least-cost CO2 path overshoots
the steady-state CO2 level. Section 2 analyzes the least-cost policy trajectory, focusing on
how inertia affects the standard Hotelling intuition. Section 3 develops a calibrated numerical
example and calculates the excess cost and abatement incurred by a Hotelling trajectory.
The final section concludes. The first appendix contains proofs and a derivation. The second
appendix contains a phase portrait analysis of the least-cost policy, details of the numerical
calibration, and analysis of a case in which the policymaker has access to a “geoengineering”
technology for directly managing temperature.
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1 Setting
A global planner seeks the least-cost emission path to limit global warming to an exogenous
level T¯ . The setting is in continuous time, with an infinite-horizon planning period. Business-
as-usual CO2 emissions E > 0 arise exogenously. The policymaker chooses each instant’s
quantity of abatement A(t), with the net emissions released to the atmosphere becoming
E − A(t). The cost of abatement is C(A(t)), where C(·) : R+ → R+ is an increasing,
twice-differentiable, continuous, and strictly convex function. Zero abatement costs nothing
(C(0) = 0), and abatement cannot be negative (A(t) ≥ 0).6
Atmospheric carbon dioxide M(t) is increased by net emissions. CO2 in excess of pre-
industrial concentrations Mpre decays at rate δ ∈ (0, 1):
M˙(t) = E − A(t)− δ (M(t)−Mpre) , (1)
where dot notation indicates a time derivative. Atmospheric CO2 generates forcing, which
is a common measure of how much heat is trapped in a period. Following the scientific
literature, forcing F (M(t)) is logarithmic in CO2 (Kondratiev and Niilisk, 1960; Mo¨ller,
1963; Rasool and Schneider, 1971; Ramaswamy et al., 2001):
F (M(t)) = α ln (M(t)/Mpre) , (2)
where α > 0 gives the additional forcing from a 1% increase in CO2 relative to pre-industrial
levels. If maintained forever, that additional forcing would generate s > 0 units of warming,
where s is a transformation of the parameter commonly known as climate sensitivity. How-
ever, inertia in the climate system means that forcing does not immediately translate into
temperature:
T˙ (t) = φ [s F (M(t))− T (t)] . (3)
The parameter φ ∈ (0, 1) controls the degree of inertia in the system. Greater φ indicates
less inertia. As φ → 1, there is no inertia: an instant’s forcing completely determines that
instant’s temperature. As φ→ 0, there is full inertia: temperature never changes irrespective
of forcing. This temperature representation is similar to that used in more complex numerical
models, except lacking an explicit ocean temperature state variable (Nordhaus, 1992, 1993,
2008).7
6We allow for net negative emissions (A(t) > E) in recognition of technologies for removing CO2 from
the atmosphere. These technologies have often been of primary interest in numerical literature discussing
“overshoot” pathways. Constraining A(t) to be less than E would not change the primary results.
7Nordhaus (1991) uses an identical formulation for the temperature transition, though ultimately lineariz-
ing the forcing relationship. When we later calibrate φ using his more recent and more complex discrete-time
models, we obtain a value just below the low end of the studies he drew upon in 1991 and about half as
large as the value he selected for his calibration. Our sensitivity analysis will include a value for φ close to
his original calibration.
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The initial time t0 is given. The initial level of CO2 is M0, and initial temperature is T0,
which is strictly less than the policy target T¯ . The policymaker’s objective is to select an
abatement trajectory in order to minimize the present cost (using discount rate r > 0) of
maintaining temperature below the policy target:8
V (M(t0), T (t0), t0) = min
A(t)
∫ ∞
t0
e−r(t−t0) C(A(t)) dt (4)
subject to equations (1) and (3),
T (t) ≤ T¯ ,
A(t) ≥ 0,
M(t0) = M0, T (t0) = T0.
Consistent with international policy discussions and with the numerical cost-effectiveness
models used to evaluate policy, all damages from climate change are reflected in the prior
choice of T¯ , so that damages at lower temperatures do not affect the policy trajectory.9 The
following assumption ensures that the policymaker faces an interesting problem:
Assumption 1. E > δ
(
Mpre e
T¯ /(s α) −Mpre
)
.
The assumption guarantees two outcomes. First, the temperature limit would be violated
if no abatement ever occurred, and second, maintaining temperature at T¯ requires strictly
positive abatement. Given the assumption and the lack of any benefit from raising emissions
beyond the business-as-usual level, we henceforth ignore the constraint that A(t) ≥ 0.
It is clearly never optimal to reach T¯ and then reduce temperature: by Assumption 1,
any such path has strictly greater cost than a path that reaches T¯ at the same point in
time but then allows sufficient emissions to remain at T¯ . Further, it is clearly not optimal
to maintain temperature strictly below T¯ at all times, as such a path is more costly than
one that allows slightly more emissions yet still remains strictly below T¯ . We can therefore
8There exists a policy program that would satisfy the constraints and yield a convergent integral: hold
abatement fixed at zero until CO2 reaches M¯ (defined below), and then hold abatement equal to the level
necessary to maintain M¯ . The cost of this program is zero until reaching M¯ and constant in current-value
terms thereafter. The cost of this policy program is clearly finite. A least-cost policy program must therefore
also have finite cost.
9A cost-benefit framework would explicitly model the possibility that warming imposes costs (“damages”),
which would motivate emission reductions. In contrast, “cost-effectiveness” integrated assessment models
avoid making assumptions about damages in order to focus on the costs imposed by policy-relevant envi-
ronmental targets. These models implement analytic results derived for settings that lack explicit damages
from warming and are the dominant approach to quantifying the cost of proposed policies and the relative
value of new technologies. We demonstrate how to correct these influential models without taking a stand
on the relative merits of the cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit approaches (see footnote 1). Our primary
point about the implications of inertia is not sensitive to combining damages with a binding temperature
limit.
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reframe the problem as deciding on the optimal path towards T¯ and on the optimal time to
reach T¯ .
Define M¯ as the unique CO2 concentration compatible with the climate system remaining
at T¯ :
M¯ ,Mpre eT¯ /(s α).
The climate dynamics themselves directly imply two important results that are typically
overlooked in the literature.
Proposition 1.
1. There exists a time q such that M˙(t) ≤ 0 for all times t ≥ q and M˙(t) < 0 for some
times t ≥ q.
2. A path constrained by temperature limit T¯ can achieve strictly less cost than a path
constrained by the corresponding CO2 limit M¯ .
Proof. See appendix.
The first result says that a least-cost CO2 trajectory overshoots the steady-state CO2 level
consistent with the temperature constraint. This occurs because of the inertia in the climate
system. Any least-cost path must approach T¯ from below, and it must reach M¯ by the time
it reaches T¯ . Climatic inertia means that the next instant’s temperature is an average of the
current temperature and of the steady-state (or “equilibrium”) temperature consistent with
the current CO2 concentration. In order to approach T¯ from below, the CO2 concentration
must approach M¯ from above. The drag in the climate system enables CO2 concentrations
to temporarily exceed their steady-state level without violating the temperature constraint.
Any path that does not take advantage of this ability to overshoot the steady-state CO2
level cannot be a least-cost path. The proposition’s second result follows from the first:
because a least-cost path must overshoot its steady-state CO2 level, indirectly achieving a
temperature constraint by directly constraining CO2 must increase the cost of the efficient
policy program.
2 Least-cost policy
The policymaker’s problem is an autonomous infinite-horizon control problem. Using the
insights from the previous section, we rewrite the problem as a fixed endpoint, free ter-
minal time problem with scrap value defined by the cost of maintaining temperature at T¯
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thereafter.10 The minimization problem therefore becomes11
V (M(t0), T (t0), t0) = min
A(t),τ
{∫ τ
t0
e−r(t−t0) C(A(t)) dt+ e−r(τ−t0) V (M¯, T¯ , τ)
}
subject to equations (1) and (3),
M(t0) = M0, T (t0) = T0
lim
t→τ
M(t) = M¯, lim
t→τ
T (t) = T¯ ,
where τ is the chosen time at which temperature reaches T¯ and CO2 reaches M¯ . We use
limits to allow for the case where τ = ∞. Because the least-cost policy will never de-
crease temperature once it has reached T¯ , the present formulation does not eliminate any
trajectories that might solve (4). Form the current-value Hamiltonian:
H(M(t), T (t), A(t), λM(t), λT (t)) =C(A(t)) + λM(t) [E − A(t)− δ (M(t)−Mpre)]
+ λT (t)φ [s α ln(M(t)/Mpre)− T (t)].
In addition to the transition equations and the initial conditions, an optimal trajectory must
satisfy the Maximum Principle and the costate conditions:
C ′(A(t)) =λM(t), (5)
λ˙M(t) =(r + δ)λM(t)− φ sα λT (t)
M(t)
, (6)
λ˙T (t) =(r + φ)λT (t), (7)
where primes indicate derivatives. To pin down an optimal trajectory, we also require a
transversality condition corresponding to the free terminal time τ . For τ <∞, this transver-
sality condition is:
e−r(τ−t0) H(M(τ), T (τ), A(τ), λM(τ), λT (τ)) = −
∂
[
e−r(τ−t0)V (M¯, T¯ , τ)
]
∂τ
. (8)
If it is optimal to reach T¯ at some finite time τ , then the policymaker must be indifferent
between bearing the time τ cost defined by the Hamiltonian and bearing the time τ portion
10One might attempt to set up the original constrained minimization problem using the necessary con-
ditions of optimal control theory via a Lagrangian formulation. However, the rank constraint qualification
is violated by the abatement control’s failure to appear in the temperature constraint, which precludes the
application of the standard necessary conditions for an optimal path, and the standard sufficiency conditions
are violated by the concavity of the forcing function (Caputo, 2005).
11The terminal condition on M follows from recognizing that M(τ) > M¯ means that temperature will rise
above T¯ in the next instant and that M(τ) < M¯ implies that less abatement could have been undertaken
while satisfying the constraint.
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of the total “scrap cost” incurred by maintaining temperature at T¯ . If the right-hand side is
greater, then the policymaker would find it cheaper to delay reaching T¯ , and if the left-hand
side is greater, then the policymaker would find it cheaper to reach T¯ earlier. The formal
analysis shows that this transversality condition implies that as t approaches τ , abatement
approaches the level required to hold the system at M¯ and T¯ .
The least-cost abatement trajectory sets the marginal cost of abatement equal to the
shadow cost of CO2, as given by λM(t) in equation (5). This is a familiar condition from
economic analysis of climate change: the shadow cost of CO2 defines the benefits of the next
unit of emission reductions, which must equal the marginal cost of emission reductions along
an optimal path. And the marginal cost of abatement is determined by a policy such as a
carbon tax or a cap-and-trade program. However, the dynamics of the shadow cost of CO2
are more interesting than commonly recognized. We begin by interpreting the shadow cost of
temperature, and we then provide an explicit form for the shadow cost of CO2 and rederive it
from an intuitive no-arbitrage condition. We conclude this section with formal results about
the optimal trajectories and the time when temperature reaches T¯ . The appendix develops
a phase portrait analysis with further intuition.
First, note that all shadow costs are positive: another unit of temperature or CO2 requires
additional abatement, which raises the cost of the policy program. The shadow cost of
temperature increases monotonically: because temperature itself monotonically approaches
the constraint along a least-cost path, suddenly raising temperature by one unit leaves less
room for adjustment the later it occurs. In fact, using equation (7), the shadow cost of
temperature obeys a familiar Hotelling-like condition, adjusted for the effects of climatic
inertia:
λT (t) = λT (t0) e
(r+φ)(t−t0). (9)
Along an efficient policy path, the policymaker must be indifferent between accepting another
unit of warming in any two instants. The benefit of delaying a unit of warming is composed of
the time benefit r λT (t) of delaying the cost by one more instant and also the inertial benefit
φλT (t) of beginning the following instant with a lower temperature. If there is extremely
high inertia (φ small), then temperature would not have changed much between the two
instants and the inertial benefit is small. But if there is extremely low inertia (φ large), then
temperature would have changed a lot and the inertial benefit is high. Along an efficient
path, these benefits must balance the additional cost imposed by delaying the temperature
increase (λ˙T (t) > 0). Equating these benefits and costs yields the Hotelling-like condition.
The least-cost abatement policy is determined by the shadow cost of CO2. From the
costate equation (6), the evolution of the least-cost abatement policy is controlled by two
terms. A first, positive term is the standard decay-adjusted Hotelling condition familiar
from past literature. This term tends to increase abatement effort over time. The second,
negative term is novel: it decreases abatement effort over time. This inertia adjustment
works to slow the increase in abatement effort by taking advantage of the climate system’s
braking services. As time passes and temperature begins approaching T¯ , λT (t) becomes
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arbitrarily large while M(t) begins decreasing to M¯ and λM(t) approaches the level required
to hold CO2 at M¯ . The growth of λT (t) eventually dominates, which means that least-cost
abatement effort tends to decrease as temperature approaches the constraint.
This second term exists because of the climate system’s inertia.12 The change in tem-
perature is a fraction φ of the difference between “equilibrium” temperature s F (M(t)) and
current temperature T (t). If CO2 were held constant, temperature would eventually reach
its equilibrium level s F (M(t)). As φ → 1, inertia disappears and temperature immedi-
ately moves to its equilibrium level s F (M(t)). The change in temperature would therefore
equal the change in forcing. Emissions directly pass through to temperature. However, in
the presence of inertia, emissions no longer directly affect the contemporaneous change in
temperature. Instead, net emissions affect how the CO2 stock changes (i.e., E − A(t) af-
fects M˙(t)), and the time t change in the CO2 stock affects the second derivative of time t
temperature (i.e., M˙(t) affects T¨ (t)). Emissions (and abatement) therefore affect the con-
temporaneous acceleration in temperature, not the contemporaneous change in temperature.
As a consequence, the effects of additional emissions are both delayed and persistent.
Using equations (6) and (9), the appendix shows that the marginal cost of abatement
obeys the following relationship along the least-cost trajectory:
λM(t0) = e
−[r+δ](t−t0)λM(t) + e−[r+δ](t−t0)λT (t)
∫ t
t0
e−(φ−δ)(t−i)
φ sα
M(i)
di, (10)
recalling that C ′(A(t)) = λM(t). The left-hand side is the present cost of abating an ad-
ditional unit of CO2 at time t0. The right-hand side is the present benefit of abating an
additional unit of CO2 at time t0. This benefit is determined by how the additional unit of
abatement changes the state variables over time. First, abating an additional unit at time t0
allows the policymaker to abate fewer units at time t. However, because CO2 decays at rate
δ, abating an additional unit at time t0 does not enable the policymaker to reduce time t
abatement by a full additional unit. If the target were expressed in units of CO2 rather than
temperature, then this would be the only term, and the shadow cost of abatement would
grow at the decay-adjusted discount rate: r + δ. This Hotelling-like condition recognizes
that the policymaker should spend fewer dollars early because it discounts future spending
and because additional CO2 emissions have more chance to decay when emitted at an earlier
time.
But the target is expressed in units of temperature, not CO2. The second component of
the present benefit of additional time t0 abatement describes how it alters time t temperature
by changing temperature (via forcing) between times t0 and t. The total reduction in time
12The M(t) in the denominator arises because forcing is logarithmic in CO2, but the negative term would
exist even under linear forcing.
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t temperature from an additional unit of time t0 abatement is:
χ(t) , − dT (t)
dA(t0)
= −
∫ t
t0
dT˙ (i)
dA(t0)
di =
∫ t
t0
[
e−δ(i−t0)
φsα
M(i)
+ φ
∫ i
t0
dT˙ (j)
dA(t0)
dj︸ ︷︷ ︸
−χ(i)
]
di,
where the last equality uses equation (3) and recognizes that dM(t)/dA(t0) = −e−δ(t−t0).
Differentiate to obtain
χ˙(t) =e−δ(t−t0)
φsα
M(t)
− φχ(t).
Integrating yields
χ(t) =e−φ(t−t0)
[
k +
∫ t
t0
e(φ−δ)(i−t0)
φsα
M(i)
di
]
.
The constant k is dT (t0)/dA(t0). However, by equation (3), time t0 abatement does not
affect time t0 temperature. Therefore k = 0. Rearranging yields:
χ(t) =e−δ(t−t0)
∫ t
t0
e−(φ−δ)(t−i)
φsα
M(i)
di > 0.
The exponential term inside the integral describes how additional time t0 abatement changes
time i forcing and how a change in time i forcing changes time t temperature. The present
value of the effect of additional time t0 abatement on time t temperature is e
−r(t−t0)λT (t)χ(t),
which is the second term on the right-hand side of equation (10).
It is instructive to examine how CO2 decay and inertia affect χ(t). First, greater CO2
decay (greater δ) reduces the time t temperature benefit from time t0 abatement because
early CO2 has less of an effect on future forcing:
dχ(t)
dδ
= e−φ(t−t0)
∫ t
t0
−i e(φ−δ)(i−t0) φsα
M(i)
di < 0.
If time t0 CO2 does not persist as long, then the forcing effect of time t0 abatement also does
not persist as long. In contrast, reduced inertia (greater φ) has conflicting effects: it increases
the importance of late changes in forcing (increasing χ(t)), but it reduces the importance of
early changes in forcing (decreasing χ(t)):
dχ(t)
dφ
=e−φ(t−t0)
∫ t
t0
[1 + (i− t)φ] e(φ−δ)(i−t0) sα
M(i)
di
=e−φ(t−t0)
[∫ tˆ
t0
[1 + (i− t)φ] e(φ−δ)(i−t0) sα
M(i)
di+
∫ t
tˆ
[1 + (i− t)φ] e(φ−δ)(i−t0) sα
M(i)
di
]
,
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where tˆ , max{t0, t − φ−1}. The first integral is negative, describing the effect of reduced
inertia operating through early changes in forcing, and the second integral is positive, de-
scribing the effect of reduced inertia operating through late changes in forcing. The net effect
of reducing inertia depends on how the CO2 concentration evolves over the interval, because
high CO2 concentrations make forcing less responsive to abatement. For times t sufficiently
close to t0 (i.e., for t ≤ t0 + φ−1), the first integral vanishes, in which case a reduction in
inertia unambiguously increases χ(t). The initial portion of the carbon price trajectory is
therefore flatter when there is more inertia in the system.
The following proposition establishes several characteristics of the least-cost trajectory:
Proposition 2. Let τ be the first time at which T (t) = T¯ , and let x be the last time prior
to τ at which M(t) is nondecreasing. If M˙(t0) > 0, then x > t0, λ˙M(x) > 0, and there exists
a unique time y ∈ (x, τ) at which λM(t) reaches a maximum. Further, for any least-cost
trajectory, τ is finite.
Proof. See appendix.
The physical dynamics governing CO2 accumulation require that abatement be increasing
at the instant with the highest CO2 concentration. The economic dynamics governing the
evolution of abatement require that CO2 either be declining or growing at a rate less than
r+ φ at the instant with the greatest abatement effort. If the CO2 concentration is initially
increasing along an optimal trajectory, then its peak occurs while abatement effort is still
increasing, and abatement peaks during the later period in which CO2 is declining towards
M¯ . If the CO2 concentration starts above M¯ and temperature starts sufficiently close to T¯ ,
then efficient abatement effort immediately begins reducing the level of CO2. The efficient
abatement path may be initially increasing or decreasing. In all cases, the policymaker steers
the system so that it reaches T¯ in finite time. A policy that reduces abatement sufficiently to
reach T¯ is cheaper than a similar policy that holds abatement just high enough to approach
T¯ only asymptotically.
Finally, we note that a Hotelling-like trajectory can re-emerge in two types of policy
environments. First, if the environmental constraint is expressed in terms of forcing rather
than temperature, then the problem becomes equivalent to a constraint on CO2. In this
case, the least-cost carbon price grows at rate r + δ. Second, if the policymaker has access
to “geoengineering” technologies which allow her to directly reduce forcing by, for instance,
shooting reflective particles into the atmosphere, then the appendix shows that the least-cost
path for deploying these technologies has their marginal cost grow at rate r+ φ. Intuitively,
the goengineering control directly affects temperature, so an efficient policy pathway equates
its marginal cost to the shadow cost of temperature. And we have already seen that the
shadow cost of temperature grows at rate r + φ, reflecting both the time benefit and the
inertial benefit of delaying a unit of warming.
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3 Numerical Example
We have seen that economic analyses of temperature limits have implemented policy pro-
grams that would be efficient for CO2 limits but not for temperature limits. Is this distinction
important? We next develop a calibrated numerical example in order to gain further quali-
tative intuition and to provide a first estimate of the gains from using the correct least-cost
policy program.
As detailed in the appendix, we calibrate our theoretical setting’s parameters to DICE-
2007 (Nordhaus, 2008) via its implementation with an annual timestep in Lemoine and
Traeger (2014). To solve the four-dimensional system of differential equations defined in
Section 2, we begin with a triplet (T (τ),M(τ), λM(τ)) such that T (τ) = T¯ , M(τ) = M¯ ,
and λM(τ) equals the marginal abatement cost that holds CO2 constant at M¯ .
13 We then
seek the value of λT (τ) consistent with these conditions and with the initial conditions. For
a given value of λT (τ), we solve the system of ordinary differential equations (1), (3), (6),
and (7) from τ but with time flowing in reverse.14 In the resulting simulation, let x be the
time t at which M(t) = M0. At a solution to the system, it must also be the case that
T (x) = T0. An optimization routine searches for the value of λT (τ) such that T (x) = T0.
At a solution, the values λM(x) and λT (x) are the efficient λM(t0) and λT (t0).
15 Using these
initial values, we then simulate the model forward in actual time, setting λM(t) to hold M(t)
constant at M(τ) for all times t > τ .
Figure 1 shows the results for temperature limits of 2◦C (left column) and 2.5◦C (right
column). The solid lines depict the least-cost pathways, and the dashed lines depict the
standard Hotelling solution, which corresponds to the solution of a model constrained to
limit CO2 to M¯ . The climate system’s inertia enables the least-cost policy to postpone
abatement to later dates without overshooting T¯ . The Hotelling policy abates emissions too
aggressively because it fails to take advantage of the climate system’s inertia. Its resulting
temperature trajectory is therefore lower than required by the temperature limit (top row),
and the system’s inertia in fact prevents temperature from ever reaching T¯ in finite time
under the Hotelling policy. Whereas the least-cost policy overshoots M¯ by 50–100 ppm
(middle row), the Hotelling trajectory never takes advantage of the breathing space afforded
by the slowness with which the climate system reacts to overshooting M¯ . As a consequence,
the carbon price starts out much higher under the Hotelling policy and rises more rapidly
until abatement nears its steady-state level (bottom row). However, after the year 2100, the
13The condition on λM (τ) follows from the transversality condition, as shown in the proof of Proposition 2.
14In general, we cannot solve the model forward by searching for the initial shadow costs λM (t0) and λT (t0)
that lead the system to obey the terminal conditions because, as is typical of saddle-path stable systems,
values slightly off the desired trajectories lead the system to a wildly different outcome. Our solution method
is closely related to the “reverse shooting” technique described in Judd (1998).
15When solving for the Hotelling trajectory, we begin with M(τ) equal to M¯ and λM (τ) equal to its
corresponding steady-state value. No search is necessary as temperature can be effectively removed from the
policymaker’s problem.
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least-cost policy does end up raising the carbon price to levels beyond any reached under the
Hotelling trajectory. As CO2 overshoots its steady-state level, the least-cost policy begins
undertaking aggressive abatement so as to reduce CO2 before temperature exceeds T¯ .
16
Consistent with Proposition 2, the efficient carbon price peaks only after CO2 has peaked,
and the carbon price then declines swiftly towards its steady-state value.
The bottom row of Figure 1 also plots the Hotelling component (dotted lines) of the least-
cost carbon price path, as given by the first term in equation (10). Recognizing inertia’s
braking services makes the least-cost trajectory differ from the Hotelling trajectory in two
ways. First, recognizing inertia tends to bend the least-cost trajectory away from its Hotelling
component. The gap between the Hotelling component and the least-cost path represents
the trajectory adjustment for inertia, which we have seen slows the carbon price’s rate of
increase. Second, recognizing inertia also reduces the initial carbon price in order to delay
abatement. This downward shift in the starting value flattens the Hotelling component of
the least-cost trajectory relative to the full Hotelling path (compare the dotted and dashed
lines). Near the initial time, the least-cost path differs from the Hotelling path primarily
via the downward shift in the initial carbon price. The trajectory adjustment becomes more
significant over time, beginning to strongly slow the carbon price’s rate of increase near the
end of this century, or around the same time that the least-cost CO2 trajectory peaks.
Figure 2 shows how the strength of inertia (left column) and the choice of discount
rate (right column) affect the least-cost trajectories for achieving a 2◦C temperature limit.
Reducing inertia (i.e., increasing φ) means that the least-cost policy has to reduce emissions
faster in order to avoid T¯ : temperature increases faster than in the baseline case even as
CO2 follows a lower trajectory (dashed lines). In contrast, increasing inertia (i.e., reducing
φ) means that the effect of current CO2 on temperature is delayed even further. The initial
portion of the emission price trajectory is therefore lower and, in line with our analytic
results, flatter. CO2 now peaks over 100 ppm above M¯ (dotted lines) even as temperature
remains further from T¯ . However, even though increasing inertia lowers the initial carbon
price, it does strongly raise the eventual peak carbon price (beyond the end of the plotted
period) because the high degree of overshoot in CO2 requires more aggressive abatement in
order to return to M¯ .
The right column of Figure 2 shows the implications of reducing the annual consumption
discount rate from the value of 5.5% used in DICE-2007 to the value of 1.4% used in Stern
(2007). By raising the present cost of each unit of future abatement, the lower discount
rate flattens the carbon price trajectory, which raises this century’s carbon prices and lowers
the next century’s carbon prices. The initially higher carbon prices imply greater abatement
early on, which lowers both the CO2 and temperature trajectories. By increasing the present
cost of future abatement, the lower discount rate reduces the economic importance of inertia.
The more that CO2 overshoots M¯ , the more abatement will eventually be needed to bring
16Even at its peak, abatement does not exceed business-as-usual emissions.
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T¯ = 2◦C T¯ = 2.5◦C
Temperature
(◦C)
Carbon
dioxide
(ppm)
Carbon
price
($/tCO2)
Figure 1: The least-cost trajectories (solid lines) for temperature, CO2, and the carbon price
for temperature limits of T¯ = 2◦C (left) and T¯ = 2.5◦C (right). Also, the conventional
Hotelling-like paths (dashed lines), which are also the least-cost paths for the corresponding
CO2 constraint.
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Varying the strength of inertia (φ) Varying the discount rate (r)
Temperature
(◦C)
Carbon
dioxide
(ppm)
Carbon
price
($/tCO2)
Figure 2: The least-cost trajectories for temperature, CO2, and the carbon price for a tem-
perature limit of T¯ = 2◦C. The solid lines show the paths under the baseline calibration. In
the left column, dashed lines double φ to 0.0182 and dotted lines halve φ to 0.0046 (from
the baseline value of 0.0091). In the right column, dashed lines lower r to 0.014 (from the
baseline value of 0.055).
16 of 26
Lemoine and Rudik Steering the Climate System July 2015
it back down to M¯ before temperature reaches T¯ (i.e., the higher the spike in the carbon
price seen in the figures’ bottom rows). Under the lower discount rate, the least-cost CO2
trajectory overshoots M¯ by only around 50 ppm, less than two-thirds of the overshoot under
the higher discount rate. Because CO2 follows a flatter trajectory, temperature tracks CO2
better than in the cases with a higher discount rate. The Hotelling component of the least-
cost carbon price (gray lines) therefore plays a stronger role under the lower discount rate;
inertia plays less of a role in dampening the increase in the carbon price when the policy
path is doing less to take advantage of inertia. Because a primary advantage of inertia is
the ability to postpone abatement, the policy implications of inertia depend strongly on the
choice of discount rate.
Table 1 describes how the present cost of the policy program, the year 2005 carbon
price, and cumulative abatement over the next 200 years vary with the temperature limit
T¯ and with the recognition of climatic inertia. In all cases, the cost of the policy program
and the initial carbon price both decline strongly in T¯ . The top panel reports results with
the DICE-2007 consumption discount rate of 5.5%. By taking advantage of the climate
system’s inertia, the least-cost policy path can save over $2 trillion as compared to the
conventional Hotelling path. Recognizing inertia allows the policymaker to save money
both by postponing abatement and by undertaking less cumulative abatement. The climate
system’s inertia allows for greater natural decay of CO2 because it delays the temperature
consequences of CO2 emissions (granting more time for decay) and because it allows the
CO2 concentration to overshoot its steady-state level (decay is proportional to the quantity
of CO2).
17 The interaction between inertia and CO2 decay generates benefits even in the
absence of discounting, and the interaction between inertia and discounting generates benefits
even in the absence of decay. The ability to postpone emission reductions and to undertake
fewer emission reductions in total lowers the initial carbon price by over 90%.
The bottom panel of Table 1 reports results with the Stern (2007) consumption discount
rate of 1.4%. Adopting a CO2 target instead of a temperature target (or failing to recognize
inertia when designing the policy program) now increases costs by only a factor of 2–6 because
inertia is more valuable under higher discount rates. However, lowering the discount rate also
raises the overall present cost of each policy program, which means that the savings from
adopting the temperature targets instead of their corresponding CO2 targets nonetheless
amount to between $300 billion and $15 trillion.
4 Conclusions
We have shown that the standard assumption of a decay-adjusted Hotelling path for the price
of carbon is not the efficient path under a temperature target. Instead, the efficient path
17The concavity of forcing in the stock of CO2 amplifies the benefits of inertia because it allows the
policymaker to overshoot the steady-state CO2 level by a greater amount and for a longer period of time.
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Table 1: The present cost of each policy program, the initial efficient carbon price, and
cumulative abatement over the next 200 years.
Temperature limit (◦C)
2 2.5 3
5.5% discount rate
Cost of efficient path from 2005–2200 ($billion) 98 1.5 0.0001
Cost of Hotelling path from 2005–2200 ($billion)a 2,465 181 1.4
CO2 price along the efficient path in 2005 ($/tCO2) 0.18 0.003 0.000003
CO2 price along the Hotelling path in 2005 ($/tCO2)
a 5.8 0.39 0.003
Abatement from 2005–2200 along the efficient path (Gt C) 682 235 6.6
Abatement from 2005–2200 along the Hotelling path (Gt C) 891 522 169
1.4% discount rate
Cost of efficient path from 2005–2200 ($billion) 12,366 1,125 9
Cost of Hotelling path from 2005–2200 ($billion)a 28,464 6,094 315
CO2 price along the efficient path in 2005 ($/tCO2) 8.3 1.3 0.05
CO2 price along the Hotelling path in 2005 ($/tCO2)
a 21 4.2 0.26
Abatement from 2005–2200 along the efficient path (Gt C) 716 296 52
Abatement from 2005–2200 along the Hotelling path (Gt C) 899 537 184
a The Hotelling paths are also the least-cost paths for the corresponding CO2 constraint.
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combines the standard Hotelling term with a second term that reflects the climate system’s
inertia. Recognizing inertia means that the efficient CO2 trajectory tends to overshoot the
steady-state level corresponding to the temperature target. Further, recognizing inertia
reduces the cost of the policy program and also tends to reduce the next decades’ carbon
prices in exchange for increasing the next century’s carbon prices. Numerically, these effects
are substantial, with the conventional Hotelling assumption inflating the estimated cost of
a 2◦C target by up to a factor of 10 and inflating the initially efficient carbon dioxide price
by over $5 per ton.
Our results have implications for both policy and economic modeling. In terms of pol-
icy, some scientists have advocated for adopting temperature targets instead of CO2 targets
because they allow greater flexibility to incorporate new information about how CO2 affects
temperature (e.g., Allen and Frame, 2007; Roe, 2010). And some economists have argued for
temperature targets as a means of directly limiting climate damages rather than trusting the
impact models embedded in cost-benefit assessments (e.g., Richels et al., 2004; Ackerman
et al., 2009). We identify a new advantage that is independent of these concerns. Framing
policy in terms of a limit on temperature rather than on CO2 allows the efficient policy
trajectory to take advantage of the climate system’s inertia. This efficient trajectory tem-
porarily exceeds the corresponding CO2 limit. The flexibility granted by the climate system’s
inertia substantially reduces the present cost of the policy program, though we assume that
the temporary “overshoot” in CO2 does not impose additional environmental costs through,
for instance, ocean acidification.
Second, numerical general equilibrium models are the primary tool for estimating the cost
of proposed climate policies. However, we have shown that common implementations of these
models typically overstate the cost of temperature targets. These implementations tend to
assume Hotelling price paths (e.g., Thomson et al., 2011; Bauer et al., 2015) and/or represent
a temperature constraint via a constraint on forcing or CO2 (e.g., Azar et al., 2010; Edenhofer
et al., 2010; Kriegler et al., 2014). Given the high degree of inertia in the climate system,
the savings from taking advantage of inertia can be a large fraction of the estimated costs.
Furthermore, these technology-rich integrated assessment models are used to learn about the
relative values of prospective low-carbon technologies, but this relative value likely depends
on whether the carbon price follows a Hotelling path or instead follows the inverse-U-shaped
trajectory described in the present paper. Implementing the more complex price path is
likely to complicate the models’ solution algorithms, but our results suggest high payoffs
since the simpler implementations appear likely to produce highly misleading results. Given
that international policy discussions are focusing on temperature limits, it should be a high
priority to reassess these models’ conclusions using frameworks that take advantage of the
braking services provided by the climate system’s inertia.
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First Appendix: Formal Analysis
This appendix contains proofs and the derivation of equation (10). The second appendix
contains a phase portrait analysis of the least-cost policy, details of the numerical calibration,
and analysis of a case in which the policymaker has access to a “geoengineering” technology.
Proof of Proposition 1
Assumption 1 implies that temperature along a least-cost path must either reach T¯ in finite
time or approach it asymptotically from below. By equation (3), there exists  > 0 such
that if T (t) ∈ (T¯ − , T¯ ) and T˙ (t) > 0, then M(t) > M¯ . And once temperature attains
T¯ , CO2 must remain no larger than M¯ in order to prevent temperature from rising past
the constraint. Further, Assumption 1 also implies that along a least-cost trajectory, CO2
must remain no less than M¯ once temperature has attained T¯ . CO2 must be strictly above
M¯ at some instant before temperature attains T¯ , and CO2 must remain fixed at M¯ once
temperature attains T¯ . Therefore, along any least-cost trajectory, there exists some time q
such that M˙(t) ≤ 0 for all times t ≥ q and such that M˙(t) < 0 for some time t ≥ q. This
establishes the first part of the proposition.
The second part follows immediately from observing that a policymaker constrained to
keep CO2 no greater than the steady-state level M¯ corresponding to T¯ never lets temperature
reach T¯ . Any path that satisfies the constrained CO2 problem therefore also satisfies the
corresponding constrained temperature problem. However, we have seen that the least-cost
CO2 trajectory must exceed M¯ in the constrained temperature problem. The least-cost
path that satisfies the temperature constraint therefore does not satisfy the corresponding
CO2 constraint. Constraining CO2 introduces an additional binding constraint that strictly
increases the cost of the least-cost policy pathway.
Proof of Proposition 2
First consider the CO2 trajectory. We know by Proposition 1 that it is nonincreasing after
some time prior to τ . Combined with the assumption that M˙(t0) > 0, we have that there
exists a last time x ∈ (t0, τ) at which M(t) is nondecreasing. At this interior maximum, it
must be the case that M˙(t) = 0 and M¨(t) < 0. Differentiating equation (1), we have
M¨(t) = −A˙(t)− δ M˙(t).
At a point where M˙(t) = 0, M¨(t) < 0 if and only if A˙(t) > 0. We know by equation (5) that
marginal abatement cost equals the shadow cost of CO2. This establishes that λ˙M(x) > 0.
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At an interior maximum of λM(t), it must be the case that λ˙M(t) = 0 and λ¨M(t) ≤ 0.
Differentiating equation (6), we have:
λ¨M(t) = (r + δ) λ˙M(t) +
[
M˙(t)
M(t)
− (r + φ)
]
φ sα
λT (t)
M(t)
.
At a point where λ˙M(t) = 0, λ¨M(t) ≤ 0 if and only if M˙(t)/M(t) ≤ r + φ. Recognizing
that M˙(t) < 0 at all times t ∈ (x, τ), we have that λ¨M(t) < 0 at any t ∈ (x, τ) for which
λ˙M(t) = 0.
We have already seen that λ˙M(x) > 0. Now consider the first time τ when T (t) = T¯ .
Proposition 1 shows that CO2 must exceed M¯ before returning to M¯ , so CO2 must be higher
the instant before τ : M(τ − ) = M¯ + γ for  small and , γ > 0. In order to achieve the
temperature limit in the next moment, abatement must be such that M˙(τ − ) = −γ. This
implies that:
M˙(τ − ) = E − A(τ − )− δ(M¯ −Mpre + γ) = −γ,
which holds if and only if:
A(τ − ) = E − δ (M¯ −Mpre)+ (1− δ) γ.
To maintain temperature at T¯ at time τ , abatement must satisfy A(τ) = E− δ (M¯ −Mpre).
Therefore abatement is higher the instant before time τ and λ˙M(τ − ) < 0. By the Interme-
diate Value Theorem, there exists some time y ∈ (x, τ − ) such that λ˙M(y) = 0. We have
already established that λ¨M(y) < 0 for all such y, so there is a unique maximum of λM(t)
between times x and τ .
Finally, consider the time τ at which the system achieves T¯ . Begin by assuming τ is
finite. Assumption 1 guarantees that abatement will be positive from that time onward and
completely determined by the level necessary to maintain temperature at T¯ . Recognizing
that M˙(τ) = 0 and T˙ (τ) = 0, the transversality condition becomes
e−r(τ−t0)C(A(τ)) = −e−r(τ−t0)∂V (M¯, T¯ , τ)
∂τ
+ r e−r(τ−t0) V (M¯, T¯ , τ).
The current value of the policy program at time τ is:
V (M¯, T¯ , τ) =
∫ ∞
τ
e−r(t−τ) C
(
E − δ
(
Mpre e
T¯ /sα −Mpre
))
dt
=
1
r
C
(
E − δ
(
Mpre e
T¯ /sα −Mpre
))
.
Therefore,
∂V (M¯, T¯ , τ)
∂τ
= 0.
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The transversality condition becomes:
C(A(τ)) = C
(
E − δ
(
Mpre e
T¯ /sα −Mpre
))
,
which holds if and only if A(τ) = E−δ (Mpre eT¯ /sα −Mpre), where the right-hand side is the
abatement level required to hold CO2 constant at M¯ . A trajectory with a finite time τ at
which the system reaches (and remains at) M¯ and T¯ does satisfy the necessary transversality
condition.
Now assume that there is no finite τ at which the system attains T¯ . The system
asymptotically approaches M¯ , which means that abatement asymptotically approaches E−
δ
(
Mpre e
T¯ /sα −Mpre
)
. Therefore
lim
τ→∞
λM(τ) = C
′
(
E − δ
(
Mpre e
T¯ /sα −Mpre
))
,
which implies
lim
τ→∞
λ˙M(τ) = 0.
Using equation (6), we have
lim
τ→∞
λ˙M(τ) = (r + δ)C
′
(
E − δ
(
Mpre e
T¯ /sα −Mpre
))
− φ sα λT (t0) e(r+φ)(τ−t0) M¯−1 = −∞.
But λ˙M(t) cannot asymptote to both zero and negative infinity. We have a contradiction.
The time τ must be finite.
Derivation of equation (10)
Substitute λT (t) into equation (6):
(r + δ)λM(t)− λ˙M(t) = φ sα
M(t)
λT (t0) e
(r+φ)(t−t0).
Integrate and rearrange:∫ t
t0
[
−(r + δ)λM(i) + λ˙M(i)
]
di =
∫ t
t0
−φ sα
M(i)
λT (t0) e
(r+φ)(i−t0) di
⇔
∫ t
t0
[
−(r + δ)e−(r+δ)(i−t0)λM(i) + e−(r+δ)(i−t0)λ˙M(i)
]
di =
∫ t
t0
−e−(r+δ)(i−t0) φ sα
M(i)
λT (t0) e
(r+φ)(i−t0) di
⇔e−(r+δ)(t−t0)λM(t)− λM(t0) = −φ sαλT (t0)
∫ t
t0
e(φ−δ)(i−t0)
M(i)
di.
Substitute in λT (t0) = e
−(r+φ)(t−t0)λT (t) and rearrange:
λM(t0) = e
−[r+δ](t−t0)λM(t) + e−[r+δ](t−t0)λT (t)
∫ t
t0
e−(φ−δ)(t−i)
φ sα
M(i)
di.
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Second Appendix
The first section contains the phase portrait analysis. The second derives the least-cost tra-
jectory for a geoengineering control. The third describes the numerical example’s calibration.
A Phase portrait analysis
We construct conditional phase portraits in order to better understand the evolution of
abatement and CO2 along a least-cost trajectory. Figure A1 depicts conditional phase por-
traits for a period with low temperature (top panel) and for a period with high temperature
(bottom panel). These two snapshots correspond, respectively, to the early part of this cen-
tury and to sometime late in this century or early in the next. The emission price (λM) is
on the vertical axes, and CO2 (M) is on the horizontal axes. Let a(·) denote the inverse of
marginal abatement cost, so that A(t) = a(λM(t)). By the properties of C(·), we have that
a(0) = 0 and a′(·) > 0.
In each panel, the downward-sloping solid curve depicts, from equation (1), the M -
nullcline:
M(t)|M˙(t)=0 =
1
δ
[E − a(λM(t))] +Mpre.
At these combinations of CO2 and abatement, the CO2 concentration is stationary. Decay
increases in CO2, so higher levels of CO2 become stationary at lower levels of abatement.
This curve is linear if abatement cost is quadratic. The downward-sloping dashed curve in
each panel depicts, from equation (6), the λM -nullcline:
λM(t)|λ˙M (t)=0 =
φ sα
r + δ
λT (t)
M(t)
= e(r+φ)(t−t0)
φ sα
r + δ
λT (t0)
M(t)
.
At these combinations of CO2 and abatement, a least-cost trajectory holds abatement con-
stant. The nullcline’s convexity arises because forcing is logarithmic in CO2, and the nullcline
shifts out as the shadow cost of temperature increases. The arrows describe the direction of
motion in each sector. They follow from recognizing that
∂M˙(t)
∂λM(t)
< 0,
∂λ˙M(t)
∂M(t)
> 0.
In sectors above (below) the M -nullcline, the direction of motion is to the left (right). In
sectors to the right (left) of the λM -nullcline, the direction of motion is upward (downward).
The top panel depicts a case in which the nullclines intersect: business-as-usual emissions
are sufficiently great that the M -nullcline is pushed out, and temperature is sufficiently far
below T¯ that its shadow cost is low and the λM -nullcline is pushed in. This case corresponds
to the present day for a sufficiently lax temperature target. The point M0 depicts a typical
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(a) Near-term
(b) Long-term
Figure A1: Phase portraits conditional on λT . Solid curves give the M -nullclines, dashed
curves give the λM -nullclines, dotted curves depict least-cost trajectories, and arrows give the
direction of motion in each sector. The top panel corresponds to a case with T (t) sufficiently
far below T¯ , and the bottom panel corresponds to a case with T (t) closer to T¯ .A-2
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starting point, and M¯ > M0 indicates the steady-state level of CO2 corresponding to T¯ .
The optimal emission price begins by following the dotted curve. It starts at a relatively low
level in the space between the two nullclines, and it increases along with CO2. It eventually
crosses the M -nullcline at Mpeak, at which point CO2 begins to fall even as abatement
continues increasing. This crossing illustrates how the least-cost CO2 trajectory temporarily
overshoots the terminal level M¯ .
As time passes, the shadow cost of temperature increases and the λM -nullcline shifts out.
1
Eventually we reach a situation such as the bottom panel, where the two nullclines no longer
intersect. This corresponds to a world like that in the next century, once temperatures are
closer to the chosen limit and once technological change has potentially lowered business-
as-usual emissions. It also corresponds to the present world under a sufficiently stringent
temperature target. In this panel, CO2 has already peaked. The story from the last panel
finished at a point such as MT , where we pick up in this panel. As already noted, abatement
is increasing and CO2 is decreasing. The terminal condition has the policymaker hitting
the M -nullcline at M¯ . As CO2 falls, the system crosses the λM -nullcline. At this point,
abatement peaks. As the policymaker steers the system towards T¯ , it decreases abatement
towards the level compatible with steady-state M¯ .
In sum, we have seen that the type of CO2 trajectory depends on the stringency of the
temperature limit. For a sufficiently lax limit, least-cost policy increases CO2 past its termi-
nal level, relying on the climate system’s inertia to avoid crossing T¯ . It then decreases CO2
back towards its terminal level, using both abatement and natural decay. For a sufficiently
stringent target, CO2 begins far enough past its terminal level that abatement policy imme-
diately begins decreasing CO2. In either case, least-cost abatement policy generally increases
before decreasing. This least-cost abatement trajectory looks quite different from the conven-
tionally assumed, monotonically increasing Hotelling-like trajectory, and the least-cost CO2
trajectory looks quite different from the CO2 trajectory implied by capping concentrations
at the terminal level M¯ .
Finally, consider how the least-cost CO2 trajectory changes with properties of the climate
system. In the top panel, whether CO2 initially increases or decreases depends on how M0
corresponds to the gap between the nullclines. For sufficiently large M0, abatement begins at
a sufficiently high level to decrease CO2. This case is more likely the larger are φ, s, α, and
λT (t0). For a given temperature, larger φ (i.e., lower inertia) increases the speed with which
warming responds to any CO2 in excess of M¯ . Larger s and α increase the effect of CO2 on
temperature, which decreases M¯ and so increases the degree to which M0 is overshooting
M¯ . Finally, greater λT (t0) corresponds to a more stringent temperature target, which also
decreases M¯ and increases the degree of overshoot from M0.
1And if business-as-usual emissions exogenously decrease, then the M -nullcline shifts in.
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B Least-cost geoengineering trajectory
The only way to achieve a CO2 target is to reduce emissions or, perhaps, to suck CO2 di-
rectly out of the atmosphere, but a temperature target could be achieved by directly reducing
forcing. Geoengineering methods for reducing forcing typically involve “solar radiation man-
agement”: if we reflect incoming solar radiation by injecting particles into the atmosphere,
by placing mirrors in space, or by brightening the tops of clouds, then we can reduce forcing
without reducing greenhouse gases. These methods are drawing increasing attention because
they are potentially cheap but also potentially full of surprises and side-effects (Keith, 2000;
Shepherd, 2012; Caldeira et al., 2013).
Extend the theoretical setting by allowing for a geoengineering control in the form of
solar radiation management. The time t level of the control is G(t) ≥ 0, and the cost of
exercising the control is a strictly increasing, convex function Z(G), where Z(0) = 0. The
geoengineering control reduces contemporaneous forcing, which changes the temperature
transition to
T˙ (t) = φ [s {F (t)−G(t)} − T (t)] . (A-1)
The policymaker’s objective is to select abatement and geoengineering trajectories in
order to minimize the present cost of maintaining temperature weakly below T¯ :
V (M(t0), T (t0), t0) = min
A(t),G(t)
∫ ∞
t0
e−r(t−t0) [C(A(t)) + Z(G(t))] dt
subject to equations (1) and (A-1),
T (t) ≤T¯ ,
A(t) ≥0,
G(t) ≥0,
M(t0) = M0, T (t0) = T0.
The current-value Hamiltonian becomes:
H(M(t), T (t), A(t), G(t), λM(t), λT (t)) =C(A(t)) + Z(G(t))
+ λM(t) [E − A(t)− δ (M(t)−Mpre)]
+ λT (t)φ [s {α ln(M(t)/Mpre)−G(t)} − T (t)].
The necessary conditions are unchanged, except that the new temperature transition equa-
tion must be obeyed and there is now an additional condition:
Z ′(G(t)) = λT (t)φ s.
Along a least-cost path, the marginal cost of geoengineering increases with the shadow cost
of temperature, which we have seen increases exponentially at rate r + φ.
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C Numerical calibration
We calibrate the example to DICE-2007 (Nordhaus, 2008), as implemented with an annual
timestep in Lemoine and Traeger (2014). All baseline runs use the 5.5% annual consumption
discount rate (r = 0.055) generally consistent with this model.2
The full DICE model includes three carbon reservoirs. Lemoine and Traeger (2014)
approximate DICE’s full carbon dynamics by making the decay rate of CO2 a function of
the atmospheric CO2 stock and time. Along the optimal path in DICE, the time-varying
decay rate for CO2 in excess of its pre-industrial level starts at 0.0141, declines to 0.0119
in 100 years, and declines to 0.0068 after 200 years. Using the average value over the first
100 years, we have δ = 0.0138. We calibrate business-as-usual CO2 emissions E to DICE’s
initial value. This yields E = 9.97 Gt C per year.
In the forcing relationship, we take Mpre = 596.4 Gt C and follow Ramaswamy et al.
(2001, Table 6.2) in using α = 5.35 W m−2, which is approximately equivalent to the param-
eters used in DICE. The full DICE model includes two temperature reservoirs. Lemoine and
Traeger (2014) simplify this setting by representing the deep ocean temperature as a func-
tion αT (T, t) of surface temperature and time. In their discrete-time setting, the temperature
transition equation becomes
Tt+1 − Tt = CT
[
Ft+1 − α ln(2)
cs
Tt − [1− αT (Tt, t)]CO Tt
]
,
where we have used cs for climate sensitivity so as to avoid confusion with the present paper’s
notation. The present paper’s parameter s gives equilibrium warming per unit of forcing,
whereas DICE’s cs = 3 gives equilibrium warming from doubled CO2. Relating the two
parameters, we have:
s =
cs
α ln(2)
= 0.809 ◦C
[
W m−2
]−1
.
Using explicit Euler difference methods, we find:
φ =
CT
[
Ft+1 − α ln(2)cs Tt − [1− αT (Tt, t)]CO Tt
]
s Ft − Tt .
Along DICE’s optimal trajectory, the inferred value of φ starts at 0.0129, falls to 0.0056 after
100 years, and falls to -0.0030 after 200 years (reflecting that the ocean begins transferring
heat to the atmosphere as the CO2 concentration declines). Using the average value over
the first 100 years, we have φ = 0.0091.
2Technically, this setting with stationary output should use a discount rate no greater than 1.5% to be
consistent with DICE-2007: consumption growth in the Ramsey equation is negative once we subtract the
cost of abatement.
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In DICE, the cost (as a fraction of time t output) of abating a fraction µt of business-as-
usual emissions is Ψtµ
a2
t , where a2 = 2.8 and
Ψt =
a0 σt
a2
(
1− 1− e
(t−t0) gΨ
a1
)
, with σt = σ0 exp
[
gσ,0
δσ
(
1− e−(t−t0) δσ)] .
The parameters are a0 = 1.17, a1 = 2, gΨ = −0.005, σ0 = 0.13, gσ,0 = −0.0073, and δσ =
0.003. Initial output Y (without adjusting for climate damages) in DICE is approximately
85 trillion dollars. We represent the cost of abatement A(t) as
C (A(t)) = Ψ0
[
A(t)
E
]a2
Y.
Finally, from DICE-2007, we have the initial CO2 stock as M0 = 808.9 Gt C, the initial
global mean surface temperature as T0 = 0.7307
◦C, and the initial time as t0 = 2005.
We solve the four-dimensional system of differential equations with a constrained opti-
mization solver. The solver selects λT (τ) to minimize the distance between T0 and T (x),
where the main text defines x as the time t at which M(t) = M0. We use Matlab’s ode23
solver with the finest tolerance that the solver allows. We search for a solution on a 700-year
mesh and discretize time to every 0.01 years. When the ode solver returns a trajectory for
a given guess of λT (τ), we select the time x by finding the latest mesh point where CO2 is
within 0.1 Gt C of M0.
3 Finally, once the solver has converged to the optimal value of λT (τ),
we use the trapezoidal method to approximate the integral of abatement cost over the mesh
points.
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